How was Consociational Power-Sharing Designed in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Process-Tracing Approach
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62843/jssr.v6i3.759Keywords:
Consociational Power-Sharing, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bonn Agreement, Constitutional DesignAbstract
This paper examines how consociational power-sharing systems of governance were designed in Afghanistan and Iraq between the collapse of the Taliban and the Ba'athist regime and the ratification of each state's post-invasion constitution. Using a process tracing approach, the paper reconstructs, institution by institution, how the 2004 Afghan Constitution and the 2005 Iraqi Constitution were designed. The paper presents original data on the ethnic and sectarian composition of each transitional body alongside the referendum data used to test each design. The paper situates its findings against the ten strands of contemporary power-sharing and constitution-making literature and finds that the two design processes of the above constitutions, although textually near-opposite in their treatment of Lijphart's four pillars, shared a common design pathology: proportional representation in the membership of transitional bodies was repeatedly decoupled from proportional decision-making authority within them.
References
Adeney, K. (2008). Constitutional design and the political salience of “community” identity in Afghanistan: Prospects for the emergence of ethnic conflicts in the post-Taliban era. Asian Survey, 48(4), 535–557. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2008.48.4.535
Ali, A., & Mushtaq, M. (2017). Peacebuilding Process and Consociational Model of Power Sharing: The Case of Afghanistan. The Pakistan Journal of Social Issues, 8(1), 63-72.
Al-Ali, Z. (2023). Flawed by design: Ethno-sectarian power-sharing and Iraq's constitutional development. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org
Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines. University of Michigan Press. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.10072208
Benomar, J., Samuels, K., & Kim, Y. (2005). Constitution making and peacebuilding: Lessons learned from UN constitution-making experience: East Timor, Afghanistan [Roundtable report]. United Nations Development Programme.
Bogaards, M. (2021). Iraq's constitution of 2005: The case against consociationalism “light.” Ethnopolitics, 20(2), 186–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1654200
Bremer, L. P., & McConnell, M. (2006). My year in Iraq: The struggle to build a future of hope. Simon & Schuster/Threshold Editions.
Chesterman, S. (2004). You, the people: The United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building. Oxford University Press.
Coalition Provisional Authority. (2003). Order number 1: De-Ba'athification of Iraqi society; Order number 2: Dissolution of entities. https://pfiffner.schar.gmu.edu/files/pdfs/Articles/CPA%20Orders%2C%20Iraq%20PDF.pdf
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. (2004). Official Gazette, No. 818. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq. (2005). Official Iraqi Gazette, No. 4012. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005
Diamond, L. (2004). What went wrong in Iraq. Foreign Affairs, 83(5), 34–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/20034066
Dobbins, J., McGinn, J. G., Crane, K., Jones, S. G., Lal, R., Rathmell, A., Swanger, R., & Timilsina, A. (2003). America's role in nation-building: From Germany to Iraq (MR-1753). RAND Corporation.
Dodge, T. (2018, November 12). Iraq and muhasasa ta'ifia: The external imposition of sectarian politics. The Foreign Policy Centre/SEPAD.
Dodge, T. (2020). Iraq's informal consociationalism and its problems. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 20(2), 145–152. https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12330
Foreign Policy in Focus. (2013). Iraq's neoliberal constitution. FPIF. https://fpif.org/iraqs_neoliberal_constitution/
George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press.
Ginsburg, T., Elkins, Z., & Blount, J. (2009). Does the process of constitution-making matter? Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 5, 201–223. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.4.110707.172247
GlobalSecurity.org/U.S. Information Agency. (2003). New governing council a huge step forward, Bremer tells Iraqis. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/07/iraq-030714-usia05.htm
GlobalSecurity.org/RFE/RL Iraq Report. (2005). Sunnis agree to join Iraq's constitutional drafting committee (Vol. 8, No. 20). https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2005/06/20-200605.htm
Haass, R. (2002). After the Taliban: The race for a new Afghanistan. PBS Frontline. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/caftertaliban.html
Hart, V. (2001). Constitution-making and the transformation of conflict. Peace & Change, 26(2), 153–176. https://doi.org/10.1111/0149-0508.00185
Hartzell, C. A., & Hoddie, M. (2015). The art of the possible: Power sharing and post-civil war democracy. World Politics, 67(1), 37–71. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000306
Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. University of California Press.
Horowitz, D. L. (2008). Conciliatory institutions and constitutional processes in post-conflict states. William & Mary Law Review, 49(4), 1213–1248. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/1868/
Human Rights Watch. (2002). Afghanistan's Bonn agreement one year later: A catalog of missed opportunities. https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/12/05/afghanistans-bonn-agreement-one-year-later
International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews. (2019). Constitution of Iraq: Process, issues and pitfalls. https://ijrar.org/papers/IJRAR19J5719.pdf
Katzman, K. (2010). Iraq: Politics, elections, and benchmarks [Congressional Research Service report]. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA468566.pdf
Khalilzad, Z. (2016). The envoy: From Kabul to the White House, my journey through a turbulent world. St. Martin's Press.
Lerner, H. (2011). Making constitutions in deeply divided societies. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793394
Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. Yale University Press.
Lijphart, A. (2004). Constitutional design for divided societies. Journal of Democracy, 15(2), 96–109. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0029
McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (2007). Iraq's constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 5(4), 670–698. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mom026
Middle East Forum. (2006). My year in Iraq [Book review]. Middle East Quarterly. https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/book-reviews/my-year-in-iraq
Mushtaq, M. (2022). Managing diversity: Why is consociationalism not an optimal solution for Pakistan? Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 28(4), 371–392. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2022.2122685
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). (2002). Strategic insight: The Loya Jirga, ethnic rivalries and future Afghan stability. https://nps.edu/documents/105988371/107571254/Loya+Jirga+Strategic+Insights.pdf
Omar, M. (2024). Constitutional choice in emerging democracies: Adoption of the 2004 Afghan constitution. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 51(4), 711–729. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2022.2156847
Paris, R. (2004). At war's end: Building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge University Press.
Pfiffner, J. P. (2010). US blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and disbanding the army. Intelligence and National Security, 25(1), 76–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684521003588120
Reilly, B. (2001). Democracy in divided societies: Electoral engineering for conflict management. Cambridge University Press.
Rhem, K. T. (2005). U.S. ambassador details negotiations for Iraqi constitution. American Forces Press Service. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2005/08/iraq-050816-afps02.htm
Roeder, P. G., & Rothchild, D. (Eds.). (2005). Sustainable peace: Power and democracy after civil wars. Cornell University Press.
Rubin, B. R. (2004). Crafting a constitution for Afghanistan. Journal of Democracy, 15(3), 5–19. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/crafting-a-constitution-for-afghanistan/
Ruttig, T. (2014). Flash from the past: Long live consensus—A look back at the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga. Afghanistan Analysts Network.
Samuels, K. (2006). Post-conflict peace-building and constitution-making. Chicago Journal of International Law, 6(2), 663–682. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol6/iss2/10
Siddique, A. (2012). Afghanistan's ethnic divides. CIDOB/Observatori. https://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_87/documentos/ABUBAKAR_SIDDIQUE.pdf
Sisk, T. D. (1996). Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic conflicts. United States Institute of Peace Press.
Transitional Administrative Law. (2004). Law of administration for the state of Iraq for the transitional period.
UK Home Office, Country Information and Policy Unit. (2004). Afghanistan country report. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1218775/1329_1200398772_2004-04-afghanistan-country-report-april-2004.pdf
United Nations Peacemaker. (2001). Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions (Bonn Agreement). https://peacemaker.un.org/afghanistan-bonnagreement2001
United Nations Security Council. (2001). Resolution 1383 (2001).
United Nations Security Council. (2003). Resolution 1483 (2003).
United States Institute of Peace. (2005). Iraq's constitutional process II: An opportunity lost (Special Report No. 155). https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr155.pdf
Widner, J. (2008). Constitution writing in post-conflict settings: An overview. William & Mary Law Review, 49(4), 1513–1541. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol49/iss4/16
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Copyright in the Journal of Social Sciences Review is retained by the author(s). Authors also grant any third party the right to use the article freely as long as its integrity is maintained and its original authors, citation details and publisher are identified.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
JSSR's Editorial Board shares the vision of providing free access to information, education, and science for everyone, thus promoting its content through an OPEN ACCESS POLICY, fulfilling the DOAJ definition of open access. The JSSR adheres to an Open Access and Copyright Licensing Policy based on the belief that making research freely accessible to the public promotes greater global knowledge sharing.
The JSSR uses the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. The authors who apply and publish in JSSR consent to abide by the copyright policy set out in the Creative Commons 4.0 license (Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license).
- Copyright in the Journal of Social Sciences Review is retained by the author(s).
- Authors also grant any third party the right to use the article freely as long as its integrity is maintained and its original authors, citation details and publisher are identified.
While "By 'open access' to this literature, we mean its free availability on the public internet, permitting any users to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of these articles, crawl them for indexing, pass them as data to software, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself."
